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Abstract
A panel of 186 European banks is used for the period 1992-2004 to determine if banking be-
haviors, induced by the capital adequacy constraint and the provisioning system, amplify credit
uctuations. We nd that poorly capitalized banks are constrained to expand credit. We also nd
that loan loss provisions (LLP) made in order to cover expected future loan losses (non discretionary
LLP) amplify credit uctuations. By contrast, LLP used for management objectives (discretionary
LLP) do not a¤ect credit uctuations. The ndings of our research are consistent with the call for
the implementation of a dynamic provisioning system in Europe.
JEL classication: G21
Keywords: Bank lending; Loan loss provisions; Capital requirement
1. Introduction
Much concern has been recently expressed about factors explaining uctuations in bank
lending. Central banks, as well as banking regulators, are concerned since such factors could
exacerbate the business cycle, cause nancial instability and misallocate lending resources.
The literature which analyzes uctuations in bank lending behavior provides some empirical
evidence of cyclicality. Asea and Blomberg (1998) show that banks change their lending
standards, from tightness to laxity, systematically over the cycle. Lax-lending standards
occur during expansions periods and a¤ect aggregate economic activity. In addition, Peek
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et al. (2003) and Lown and Morgan (2006) clearly identify the e¤ects of loan supply shocks
on uctuations in credit and GDP.
Misevaluation of credit risk over the business cycle may explain uctuations in bank
lending. In phases of economic boom, banks are inclined to take on greater risks, owing to
their basically positive anticipations as regards the course of the economy and future trends.
By contrast, banks are excessively pessimistic during cyclical downturns if they overstate
credit risk. Disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring, 1984), herd behavior (Rajan, 1994)
and the institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2003) account for misevaluation
of credit risk. Disaster myopia emphasizes that banks tend over time to underestimate
the probability of low-frequency shocks while herd behavior focuses on the idea that banks
management is obsessed with short-term concerns and perception of reputation. As for the
institutional memory hypothesis, it stresses that current loan o¢ cers ease credit standards
over time. The previous loan bust is not remembered because of loan o¢ cer turnover.
The literature which analyzes uctuations in bank lending also focuses on the impact of
monetary policy shocks. A better understanding of the economys response to a monetary
policy shock requires to consider a bank lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) which
emphasizes the role of imperfections in the market for bank debt. This hypothesis is empir-
ically supported by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) for American banks and by Ehrmann
et al. (2003) for European banks. Imperfections in the market for bank capital can also be
stressed to explain uctuations in bank lending. Van den Heuvel (2002) focuses on capital
requirements and denes a bank capital channel by which monetary policy can change the
supply of bank loans through its impact on bank equity. The e¤ects of capital requirements
on bank lending does not only only operate through changes in monetary policy. Capital
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requirements are also relevant in explaining the impact of macroeconomic conditions and
changes in banking regulation on bank lending (Furne, 2001; Zicchino, 2005).
In this paper, we point out another factor which may amplify the cyclicality of bank
lending: the provisioning system. Provisioning rules and capital requirements are linked
through the coverage of credit risk: the conceptual framework of credit risk management
supposes that expected losses have to be covered by loan loss provisions while unexpected
losses have to be covered by bank capital. While regulatory constraint explicitly links the
expansion of bank lending with bank capital, such a constraint does not exist on provisioning
rules. However, loan loss provisions have a direct impact on banks prot. An underestimated
expected credit risk could reinforce banksincentives to grant new loans since lending costs
are understated. In addition, increases in loan loss provisions due to deterioration in loan
portfolio quality can lead to a decrease in banks capital if losses are too strong. Credit
risk management without provisioning rules covering expected credit risk may therefore
have procyclical e¤ects. This concern is all the more important as banking regulators and
academic researchers focus mainly on capital requirements and tend to disregard provisioning
practices. Hence, in this paper we analyze if the evolution of loan loss provisions may explain
changes in bankslending behavior over the business cycle.
The relationship between loan loss provisions and credit supply uctuations has to be
cautiously analyzed because loan loss provisions merge di¤erent information and behaviors.
The literature distinguishes two components1. The rst one, called the non discretionary
1Accounting practices distinguish specic provisions and general provisions (Cortavaria et al., 2000).
Specic provisions are dened by specic accounting rules. They depend on identied credit losses and they
will increase specic loan loss reserves which are deducted from assets. General provisions have to cope with
latent losses not yet identied and will be added to general loan loss reserves on liabilities, but banks do
not implement rigorous and statistical methods to compute them. Consequently, general provisions depend
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component, is made in order to cover expected future credit losses in a banks loan portfolio
(Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). Provisioning practices are said to be backward-
looking because banks mainly relate non discretionary provisions to problem loans. During
economic upswings, few problem loans are identied and the level of loan loss provisions is
low. Conversely, during downturns loan loss provisions increase because loan defaults are
usually high. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) show that
the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets exhibit a strong cyclicality. As a result, the
non discretionary component is a driving force in the cyclicality of loan loss provisions and
leads to a misevaluation of expected credit losses. Indeed, the expected credit risk appears
as soon as the loan is granted and not only during the downturn when the problem loans are
nally identied. A time-lag can notably be stressed between riskier loans which are granted
during the peak of the business cycle (Jiménez and Saurina, 2005) and loan loss provisions
which are built up only during the next downturn according to backward-looking rules.
Expected credit losses are therefore under-provisioned during an upswing phase. Conversely,
banks have to charge provisions too late during the downturn. The cyclicality of loan loss
provisions directly a¤ect bank prots and bank capital (Jordan et al., 2002) which could
inuence the banks incentive to grant new loans and increase the cyclicality of its lending.
The second component, called the discretionary component, is due to the utilization of
loan loss provisions for management objectives. At least three di¤erent discretionary ac-
tions can be distinguished (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Ahmed et al., 1999). The rst one
is the income smoothing behavior. Banks have incentives to smooth earnings over time.
When earnings are expected to be low, loan loss provisions are deliberately understated
partially on expansion of total loans and they are manipulated by discretionary behaviors of bank managers.
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to mitigate adverse e¤ects of other factors on earnings. On the other hand, when earn-
ings are unusually high, banks choose discretionary income-reducing accruals. Thus, under
the income-smoothing behavior, banks choose accruals to minimize the variance of reported
earnings. This implies that loan loss provisions increase during an expansionary phase and
decrease during a recession phase. The two other discretionary actions are concerned with
capital management and signaling. With regard to capital management, capital-constrained
banks can use discretionary accruals to achieve regulatory-capital targets. General and spe-
cic provisions reduce Tier 1 capital via their e¤ect on earnings and then poorly capitalized
banks could be less willing to make loan loss provisions However, general provisions are
also included as components of Tier 2 capital and deduced from risk-weighted assets2. An
increase in general provisions may actually increase the regulatory capital, especially if the
increase in Tier 2 is larger than the decrease in Tier 1 capital. To the extent that such
discretionary behavior increases regulatory capital without a corresponding reduction in risk
of insolvency, it constitutes a regulatory capital arbitrage. The last discretionary behavior
occurs when banks use loan loss provisions to signal their nancial strength. The bank
manager can signal that the earning power of the bank is strong enough to absorb future
potential losses by increasing current loan loss provisions.
Although the recent debate about whether current practices of provisioning are biased
towards procyclical bank behavior, there is no study to our knowledge which explicitly
examines the impact of loan loss provisions on bank lending. Shrieves and Dahl (2002)
- analyzing the utilization of the discretionary accounting practice of the Japanese banks
during 1989-1996 - nd a negative and signicant relationship between loan loss provisions
2General provisions can increase loan loss reserves of up to 1.25% of risk weighted assets.
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and year-on-year change in total loans. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
loan loss provisions inuence credit cycles. However, to test explicitly the impact of loan
loss provisions on the uctuations of bank lending, the discretionary component and the
non discretionary component need to be distinguished. Indeed, the cyclical behavior of
non discretionary provisions should reinforce the cyclical nature of bank lending. On the
contrary, the discretionary component, through the income smoothing behavior, may reduce
the procyclicality of bank lending. Using a panel of European banks for the period 1992-
2004, we estimate the non discretionary and discretionary components of loan loss provisions
in order to individually isolate their impact on banks lending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports the empirical
methodology employed to di¤erentiate the discretionary and non discretionary components
of loan loss provisions. Section 3 presents estimates of the impact of provisioning practices on
credit uctuations. Section 4 discusses the credit cycle and dynamic provisioning practices.
Concluding remarks are presented in the nal section.
2. Estimation of the discretionary and non discretionary components of loan loss
provisions
2.1.Data and descriptive statistics
We use a sample consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual report data from 1992
to 2004 for a set of European commercial and cooperative banks3 established in 15 Euro-
3We choose a sample of commercial and cooperatives banks to work on an harmonized set of banks. We
do not exclude from our sample banks involved in mergers or acquisitions. Nervetheless, few banks present
a structural break in the balance sheet: less than 20 banks present a variation of total asset over the period
greater than 20% (the sample mean of the variation of total asset is 10.58%).
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pean countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. The bank
data used for the estimates come from Bankscope Fitch IBCA4. A majority of banks do not
give information on some variables needed by this study (especially non performing loans
and total capital ratio). Also we delete banks with less than ve years of time series obser-
vations. Moreover, we exclude outliers by eliminating the extreme bank/year observations
when a variable present extreme values 5. The nal sample consists of 186 European banks
out of the 2 513 available at the beginning. However, our unbalanced sample represents a
signicant part of total loans available in Bankscope Fitch IBCA. The average cover rates
of total loans are around 37% in 1992 and 54% in 2004. Table A1 (see Appendix) shows
descriptive statistics
2.2. Modelling bank provisions
To test the impact of loan loss provisions (LLP) on uctuations in bank lending, we
need to estimate the discretionary and the non discretionary components of LLP. We use
a methodology similar to the one developed by Ahmed et al. (1999). Factors which may
explain the choice of LLP are grouped into three classes.
First, the non discretionary component of LLP reects expected losses but backward-
looking rules based on identied credit losses give a strong cyclicality to this component.
The model includes three variables which represent the risk of a banks portfolio. The ratio
of non performing loans to gross loans at the end of the year t (NPLit) and the rst di¤erence
4All the banks in our sample publish their annual nancial statements at the end of the calendar year.
5The outliers represent 125 banks of the banks excluded of our sample (5% approximately of the initial
sample). Thus most of the banks were deleted because we miss data about some variables.
7
of NPLit (t+1=tNPLit = NPLit+1   NPLit) are good indicators of the risk of default on
banksloans. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between these two variables and LLP.
We also include the risk of default for the overall credit portfolio, measured by the ratio of
loans to total asset (Lit). The coe¢ cient associated with this variable should also be positive.
Second, the discretionary component of LLP results from three di¤erent management ob-
jectives. Under the income smoothing hypothesis, banks understate (overstate) LLP when
earnings are expected to be low (high) relative to that of other years (inter-temporal smooth-
ing). If banks use LLP to smooth earnings, then we would expect a positive relation between
earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (ERit) and LLP. As the propensity to smooth
income is higher for banks with good performance relative to banks with moderate current
performance, we introduce a dummy variable which takes the value of ERit for banks with
positive earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions and 0 otherwise (ER_Hit). We should
nd a positive coe¢ cient for ER_Hit if there is non linearity in the relation between LLP
and earnings. Poorly capitalized banks can also use LLP to manage regulatory capital. We
compute the variable TCRLit which takes the value of the total capital ratio (TCR) minus
8 and divided by 8 when observations for bank i are in the rst quartile of TCR and 0
otherwise. A positive correlation between LLP and TCRLit could be expected if poorly cap-
italized banks are less willing to make LLP (Shrieves and Dahl, 2002). However, accounting
relations could also inuence the relation between bank capital and loan loss provisions6. If
regulatory capital variations are more related to retained earnings than loan loss allowances,
6Regulatory capital is composed of Tier 1 - which includes equity and retained earnings - and Tier 2 -
which includes subordinated debt and loan loss allowances. LLP are therefore positively correlated to Tier
2 and negatively to Tier 1.
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correlation should be negative between LLP and TCRLit7. LLP can nally also be used
to signal their nancial strength. Beaver et al. (1996) suggest that loan loss provisions can
indicate that "management perceives the earnings power of the bank to be su¢ ciently strong
that it can withstand a hit to earnings in the form of additional loan loss provisions". If sig-
naling is an important incentive in choosing LLP, then we should observe a positive relation
between LLP and changes in future earnings before taxes and LLP (Whalen, 1994; Ahmed
et al., 1999). The variable SIGNit, dened as the one-year-ahead changes of earnings before
taxes and loan loss provisions (SIGNit = (ERit+1   ERit)=0:5(TAt + TAt+1);where TA is
the total asset), is computed to test the signaling hypothesis. A positive correlation with
LLP is expected.
Third, the macroeconomic environment should a¤ect the ability of borrowers to repay
banksassets. The private sector wealth will vary with the economic cycle, so we introduce
the annual growth rate of GDP, _yit. We expected a negative sign for the variable _yit8.
Equation (1) models the relationship between loan loss provisions and the explanatory
variables dened above:
LLPit = 0 + 1
(+)
LLPit 1 + 2
(+)
NPLit + 3
(+)
t=t+1NPLit + 4
(+)
Lit + 5
( )
_yit (1)
+6
(+)
ERit + 7
(+)
ER_Hit + 8
(+= )
TCRLit + 9
(+)
SIGNit + "it;
where LLPit is the ratio of loan loss provisions (specic provisions plus general provisions) to
7We use in our study the total capital ratio (TCR = TIER1+TIER2) because a majority of banks do not
give specic information on their level of TIER 1 and TIER 2.
8Some studies have empirically studied the economic cycle as a determinant of loan loss provisions (Fer-
nandez de Lis et al. (2001), Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005)). They nd a
signicant and negative impact on provisions: loan losses increase (and hence LLP) when _yit decreases.
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total assets at the end of the year t for bank i. We introduce the lagged dependent variable
as explanatory variable to take into account a dynamic adjustment of LLPit. If banks adjust
their provisions slowly to recognize potential losses against loans following a default event,
then provisions could be systematically related to each period. The model accounts for the
possibility that the use of discretionary LLP for one purpose is conditional on the e¤ects of
the other two motivations; this is done by jointly estimating the relationships between loan
loss provisions and income smoothing, capital management and signaling behaviors.
Equation (1) is estimated to compute the non discretionary component (NDISCit) and
the discretionary component (DISCit) of LLP. We assume that these two components are
linear functions of the variables included in equation (1). Thus, the non discretionary com-
ponent of LLP is estimated as the sum of the products of its explanatory variable times the
corresponding estimated coe¢ cient from equation (1). The same method is used to compute
the discretionary component.
2.3. Empirical results
As we consider a dynamic adjustment of LLP, equation (1) is estimated with the gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM) using rst di¤erences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and
orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995). The results are reported in Table 1.
This estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We also ensure that the
correlations between exogenous variables are weak.
The coe¢ cients on NPLit (2) and on t=t+1NPLit (3) are signicantly positive at the
1% level. This result implies that the cyclical evolution of non performing loans inuences
provisioning via the backward-looking rules. Bank prots are therefore also inuenced by the
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cyclicality of identied credit losses via loan loss provisions. The other variable introduced to
assess the e¤ect of expected credit losses on LLP choices, the ratio of loans to total asset Lit,
is not signicant at the 10% level. The signicant and negative coe¢ cient for GDP growth
(5) indicates that the macroeconomic situation is relevant, which strengthens the cyclical
behavior of LLP. Business cycle inuences nancial strength of rms and households and
therefore is closely related to problem loans. This implies not only an increase in specic
provisions according to backward-looking rules but also an increase in the general provisions
as the GDP growth modies the credit exposure of banks. The lagged dependent variable is
also signicant at the 1% level, which suggests that banks adjust their provisions gradually
to recognize potential losses against loans.
Concerning the discretionary behaviors, our results show that poorly capitalized banks
use LLP to manage regulatory capital. Provisions of poorly capitalized banks vary directly
with their surplus regulatory capital (8>0). When regulatory capital surpluses of poorly
capitalized banks are increasing, these banks can increase loan loss provisions9. Thus, poorly
capitalized banks are less inclined in making LLP. The estimated coe¢ cient of the variable
earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (6) is signicant and negative. This is not
consistent with the hypothesis of an income smoothing behavior. On the contrary, banks
reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase.
This result strengthens the cyclicality in loan loss provisions already underscored by the non
discretionary component since high earnings are recorded during economic upswings. Beside,
9To check for robustness, equation (1) was also ran with the variable total capital ratio (TCR). This
variable is not signicant. It means that only poorly capitalized banks use LLP to manage regulatory
capital. Our other conclusions remain valid. These results are not presented in the paper but are available
from the authors upon request.
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the variable ER_Hit, accounting for banks with a relatively good performance, exhibits a
positive and signicant coe¢ cient (7). This result suggests a non linearity in the relation
between LLP and earnings. Banks with relatively good performances are more able to o¤set
the cyclicality of loan loss provisions. However, wald tests shows that the total impact
(6 + 7) of earnings on loan loss provisions remains negative and signicantly di¤erent
from zero at the 5% level for banks with a relatively good performance. With regard to the
signaling behavior, banks may use discretionary LLP to signal nancial strength. We nd
that the coe¢ cient on SIGNit (9) is positive and signicant, which is consistent with the
signaling hypothesis.
We use the estimates of equation (1) to compute the non discretionary (NDISC) and the
discretionary (DISC) components of LLP. It is assumed that these two components are linear
functions of the di¤erent variables included in equation (1). Thus, they are estimated as the
sum of the products of its explanatory variables times the corresponding estimated coe¢ -
cients from equation (1). To check for robustness, we compute di¤erent non discretionary
and discretionary variables. The following three non discretionary variables are computed
for each of two methods of estimation (Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995)):
NDISC1it = 1LLPit 1 + 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit + 4Lit + 5 _yit; (2)
NDISC2it = 1LLPit 1 + 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit + 5 _yit; (3)
NDISC3it = 1LLPit 1 + 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit: (4)
The variable NDISC1it includes all the variables which may explain the non discretionary
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component as well as the the annual growth rate of GDP ( _yit) which a¤ects the ability
of borrowers to repay banksassets. The variable NDISC2it only includes the signicant
variables at the 10% level, which implies that the variable Lit is excluded compared to
NDISC1it. The third non discretionary variable (NDISC3it) excludes _yit and the variable
Lit. On the same way, two discretionary components are computed:
DISC1it = 6ERit + 7ER_Hit + 8TCRLit + 9SIGNit; (5)
DISC2it = 7ER_Hit + 9SIGNit: (6)
We consider the set of explanatory variables that are signicant to compute the rst discre-
tionary variable, DISC1it. For the second one, we only keep the variables that may smooth
loan loss provisions: ER_Hit and SIGNit. Income smoothing and signaling behaviors may
o¤set the evolution of non discretionary provisions, increasing loan loss reserves in good
times. These provisions are accumulated when banks record strong earnings and signal their
strong earnings power. This occurs when banks are in a good nancial situation and could
positively a¤ect banksincentives to supply credits.
These discretionary and non discretionary variables are used to test the impact of provi-
sioning behaviors on bank loans uctuations.
3. Credit uctuations and provisioning practices
3.1. Specication of credit uctuations
An empirical model on bank lending uctuations is used to investigate implications of
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banks provisioning practices. The model we estimate is written as:
t 1=tLit = 0 + 1
(+)
t 2=t 1Lit 1 + 2
(+)
t 1=tDit + 3
(+)
_yit + 4
( )
iit + 5
( )
it + 6
(+)
TCRLit
+7
( )
NDISCit + 8
( )
NDISCit Dum+ 9
(+=?)
DISCit + uit; (7)
where t 1=tLit = (Lit   Lit 1)=0:5(TAit + TAit 1); TAit is the total asset; t 1=tDit is the
growth rate of deposits between year (t  1) and t; _yit is the GDP growth rate between the
year (t 1) and t; iit is the money market rate; it is the ination rate; TCRLit equals (total
capital ratio-8)/8 when observations for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital
ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; NDISCit equals to NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it;
DISCit equals to DISC1it or DISC2it; NDISCit  Dum equals to the non discretionary
variable (NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it) multiplied by a dummy variable which takes
the value of 1 if the bank i is classied as poorly capitalized and 0 otherwise.
Three groups of variables are considered in the model. Firstly, three macroeconomic
variables are introduced. By including ination and GDP growth rate, the model accounts
for the economic environment. We should nd a positive sign for the GDP growth rate
(3>0) since this variable is related to loan demand. The annual ination rate should have
a negative sign (5<0). The sign of the coe¢ cient associated with the money market rate
should be negative (4<0) according to the e¤ect of a contractionary monetary policy on
bank lending.
Secondly, we consider bank specic variables. We expect a positive relationship between
bank loans uctuations and the growth rate of deposits between year (t  1) and t (2>0).
Furthermore, one variable is computed to take into account the e¤ect of regulatory capi-
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tal requirements, TCRLit. We should nd a positive sign for the coe¢ cient associated to
TCRLit (6>0) since the regulatory capital requirements should represent a constraint for
poorly capitalized banks.
Finally, three variables are introduced to analyze the relationship between loan loss
provisions and credit supply uctuations. First, the non discretionary component of LLP
(NDISCit) takes up reserves that banks have to charge to o¤set their problem loans. This
component of loan loss provisions is therefore expected to reduce banks incentive to expand
its credit supply (7<0) as it directly a¤ects prots. During a downturn, the overall return
on lending is particularly a¤ected by the upsurge in loan loss provision resulting from back-
ward looking rules. We expect a negative coe¢ cient whatever the non discretionary variable
considered: NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it. Second, we introduce an interaction vari-
able NDISCit  Dum (Dum is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bank
i is classied as poorly capitalized) to test if there is non-linearity in the relation between
non discretionary provisions and credit uctuations. Indeed, the e¤ect of non discretionary
provisions on credit uctuations could be stronger for poorly capitalized banks (8<0) since
these banks cannot use a capital bu¤er to face an upsurge in loan losses. Third, we consider
a discretionary variable: DISC1it or DISC2it. The second one takes only into account
discretionary behaviors that may have a counterbalancing e¤ect on the cyclical evolution of
non discretionary provisions: the income smoothing and the signaling. Such provisions are
made when banks are in a good nancial situation which could positively a¤ect their abil-
ity to supply credits. We therefore expect a positive relationship between the discretionary
variable DISC2it and credit uctuations in equation (7) (9>0). The discretionary variable
DISC1it accounts for di¤erent behaviors. As the capital management behavior may have
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no clear e¤ect on the cyclicality of bank lending and as the variable ERit does not have the
expected sign, the sign of the coe¢ cient associated with the discretionary variable DISC1it
is unknown.
3.2. Empirical results
The estimation of equation (7) is performed with the generalized method of moments
(GMM). This method is relevant because the provisioning constraints (variables NDISCit
and DISCit) are built using the coe¢ cients from the regression of equation (1) and therefore
contains measurement error. In addition, the lag of the endogenous variable can lead to a
simultaneity bias. These variables are therefore instrumented. Table 2 reports estimates
obtained using the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 10. As we have
three di¤erent non discretionary variables (NDISC1it, NDISC2it and NDISC3it) and two
di¤erent discretionary variables (DISC1it and DISC2it), Table 2 displays results for six
estimations11.
As expected, macroeconomic variables are relevant in credit uctuations in all estimates.
The coe¢ cient of the GDP growth rate (3) is signicant and positive whereas the coe¢ cient
of the ination rate (5) is negative and signicant. The coe¢ cient of the money market
interest rate (4) is signicant and negative. It means that monetary policy a¤ects bank
lending. We also nd that banks use deposits to expand credit as the coe¢ cient 2 is positive
10Equation (7) is also estimated with the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). These
results are similar to the ones obtained with the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995). They are
not presented in the paper but are available from the author upon request.
11To check for robustness we also introduce in equation (7) the variation of total assets to take into
account structural breaks which may a¤ect the credit supply after a merger/acquisition. This variable, which
is strongly correlated with the growth rate of deposits, is positive and signicant for the six estimations.
Overall, the vast majority of conclusions remain valid. These results are not presented in the paper but are
available from the authors upon request.
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and signicant.
With regard to the institutional constraints, we nd that the coe¢ cient associated with
the regulatory capital requirements for poorly capitalized banks (6) is positive and signi-
cant at the 1% level. These banks are therefore constrained in their lending activities.
The provisioning rules also appear relevant in all estimates. Non discretionary loan loss
provisions (7) a¤ect credit uctuations negatively and signicantly at the 1% level (this
result is also supported with the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator). Backward-looking
provisioning rules therefore amplify credit cycle: weak specic provisions during upswing
phases encourage banks to expand credit whereas the sudden identication of problem loans
during downturns constrains banks to make provisions, which reduces their incentive to
supply new credits. As expected, poorly capitalized banks appear more constrained by the
provisioning system. Indeed, the coe¢ cient associated by the interacting term NDISCit 
Dum is negative and signicant. Jordan et al. (2002) emphasize that the cyclicality of loan
loss provisions is reected in bank capital. Indeed, bank capital can also be used to face
expected credit losses following a sudden quality deterioration of the loan portfolio. Capital
requirements force poorly capitalized banks to shrink further lending when non discretionary
provisions increase.
Estimation of the e¤ect of discretionary provisions does not provide conclusive results.
Coe¢ cients associated with variable DISC1it (9) are negative and signicant at the 1%
level12. Strong discretionary provisions could therefore negatively a¤ect bank lending like
non discretionary provisions but 9 is signicantly weaker in absolute value than (7). Dis-
cretionary provisions are therefore less relevant than non discretionary provision to explain
12However, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator gives similar result only with specication (7.1).
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bank lending behavior. In addition, DISC1it merges several discretionary behaviors which
makes di¢ cult the interpretation of this result. Variable DISC2it takes only into account
provisions made for an income smoothing and/or a signaling purposes. This variable is sig-
nicant at the 1% level with the expected positive sign in specications (7.4) and (7.6) but
it is not signicant at the 10% level in specication (7.5)13. Thus we do not nd a robust
relation between the discretionary variable DISC2it and credit uctuations. Moreover, even
if the coe¢ cient associated with variable DISC2it (9) is signicant and positive, it is al-
ways signicantly weaker in absolute value than 7 and then its positive impact on bank
lending is limited. As a result, these discretionary provisions are made when banks are in a
good nancial situation but this provisioning behavior does not seem necessarily relevant to
explain bank lending behavior.
4. Credit cycle and dynamic provisioning
A dynamic provisioning system could break or more precisely o¤set the correlation be-
tween non discretionary provisions and credit uctuations. With a statistical or dynamic
provisioning system, general and specic provisions are created continuously in the tradi-
tional manner. In addition to these provisions, statistical provisions are created with purpose
of anticipating risks arising from changes in business cycles. Statistical provisions are com-
puted as the di¤erence between expected credit losses and specic provisions, i.e. they can
either be positive or negative. Spain implemented a dynamic provisioning system in 2000
(Fernandez de Lis et al, 2001). Banks have to estimate precisely their expected credit losses
over the business cycle using their own internal models or a standard approach developed
13In addition, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator gives similar result only with specication (7.6).
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by the regulator. As a result, banks build up statistical provisions during upswing phases
when contemporaneous problem loans and consequently specic provisions are weak com-
pared to total loans  and draw down these reserves during downturns. Over the full
business cycle, total provisions (specic, general and statistical) are therefore smoothed.
Previous researches (Fernandez de Lis et al, 2001; Borio et al., 2001; Mann and Michael,
2002; Jiménez and Saurina, 2005) emphasize the e¤ect of dynamic provisioning to smooth
bank income and to stabilize bank capital. The improvement in the evaluations of both
credit risks and bank prots explain these positive outcomes. Furthermore, our ndings
show that provisioning also inuences credit uctuations. The e¤ect of non discretionary
provisions on credit uctuations result directly from an unsatisfactory backward-looking
provisioning system. This factor is not the main source of credit uctuations, but it could be
easily removed. Non discretionary provisions would be smoothed in a dynamic provisioning
system (Fernandez de Lis et al , 2001). This system could therefore remove the banks
incentive to grant new loans when non dicretionnary provisions are decreasing, i.e. when the
expected credit risk could be underestimated.
Our research gets to the heart of the di¤erences in opinion between nancial supervi-
sors and accounting authorities. Over recent years, di¤erent approaches have been proposed
to change both national and international accounting standards in order to include more
forward-looking practices (Borio et al., 2001). Dynamic provisioning promotes banking sta-
bility whereas Full Fair Value Accounting14 (FFVA) promotes market discipline. Given the
cyclicality of bank lending, our results support a dynamic provisioning system as it provides
14Full fair value accounting tries to approximate as closely as possible the value that the asset would have
if it were traded on the market. One of the benets of fair value accounting is that it o¤ers better information
to investors.
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a more satisfactory institutional arrangement. Conversely, FFVA is not appropriate to sup-
port nancial stability. It can enhance the procyclical character of bank lending because
immediate recognition of unrealized value might reinforce the e¤ects of shocks (Enria, 2004).
It also increases banksearnings and regulatory capital volatilities (Barth et al., 1995) which
can impact the volatility of banksbalance sheets. More generally, FFVA does not ade-
quately recognize the specic nature of bank lending. It views banks as portfolio managers
rather than as institutions that solve informational problems. For example, Freixas and Tso-
mocos (2004) show that FFVA a¤ect the liquidity transformation role of banks and could
reduce their contribution to inter-temporal smoothing. The banking industry and banking
supervisor are therefore opposed to FFVA (Chisnall, 2000).
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to determine if the current provisioning system in Europe
amplies credit uctuations by using a panel of 186 European banks for the period 1992-
2004. Our results show that the non discretionary component of LLP amplies the credit
cycle. During an upswing, banks tend to underestimate expected credit risk and then reduce
non discretionary LLP. Banksincentives to grant new loans are therefore reinforced since
lending costs are understated. Conversely, sudden identication of problem loans during
a downturn constrains banks to make non discretionary provisions, which reduces their
incentive to supply new credits. In addition, this e¤ect is stronger for poorly capitalized
banks since these banks cannot use a capital bu¤er to face an upsurge in loan losses. On
the contrary, the discretionary component of LLP does not seem relevant to explain credit
uctuations. Our ndings are consistent with the call for the implementation of a forward-
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looking principle in Europe through a dynamic provisioning system as in Spain. The adoption
of a dynamic provisioning system at the European level may imply to harmonize accounting
and taxes rules which are very di¤erent across countries. The bank regulatory capital which
incorporates general provisions up to a ceiling would also need to be changed in order to
solely cover unexpected losses.
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Appendix:
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for European commercial and cooperative banks,
on average over the period 1992-2004.
L L D E NPL LLP TCR ROA
Mean 58:53 6:51 65:67 7:22 5:08 0:41 12:43 0:61
Max 97:89 48:02 92:32 75:84 29:02 3:76 39:32 3:09
Min 11:63  25:77 12:10 1:55 0:00  0:35 6:01  6:09
Std 16:25 7:75 14:56 4:43 4:37 0:36 4:26 0:54
Variable denitions: All variables are in percentage. L: loans/total assets; L: loansvariation
of bank i between years (t-1) and t / 0.5*(total assets of year (t-1) + total assets of year t); D:
deposits/total assets; E: equity/total assets; NPL: non-performing loans/gross loans; LLP : loan
loss provisions/total assets; TCR: total capital ratio; ROA: return on asset.
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Table 1: Non discretionary and discretionary components of LLP(equation (1))
(1.1)
(Arellano-Bond)
(1.2)
(Arellano-Bover)
LLP it( 1)
(+)
0.2624a
(0.0357)
0.2723a
(0.0336)
NPLit
(+)
0.0261a
(0.0098)
0.0248a
(0.0084)
t=t+1NPLit
(+)
0.0009b
(0.0004)
0.0011a
(0.0004)
Lit
(+)
0.0029
(0.0022
0.0026
(0.0019)
_yit
(-)
-0.0113a
(-0.0044
-0.0120a
(-0.0041)
ERit
(+)
-0.3522a
(-0.0298)
-0.3541a
(-0.0278)
ER_H it
(+)
0.2271a
(0.0306)
0.2204a
(0.0292)
TCRLit
(+)
0.4148a
(0.1476)
0.4190a
(0.1420)
SIGN it
(+)
0.0299c
(0.0163)
0.0335b
(0.0148)
J-stat
(p-value)
45.16
(0.51)
43.23
(0.58)
Obs. 739 739
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity following Whites methodology.
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Table 2: Bank loan uctuations (Arellano Bover (1995) estimator)
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6)
t 1=tLit( 1)
(+)
0.0268a
(0.0031)
0.0159a
(0.0016)
0.0124a
(0.0018)
0.0440a
(0.0020)
0.0430a
(0.0043)
0.0241a
(0.0023)
t 1=tDit
(+)
0.2270a
(0.0031)
0.2363a
(0.0017)
0.2389a
(0.0018)
0.2517a
(0.0045)
0.2716a
(0.0020)
0.2611a
(0.0022)
_yit
(+)
0.9673a
(0.0344)
0.9644a
(0.0162)
1.099a
(0.0220)
0.8865a
(0.0176)
0.9329a
(0.0326)
1.0406a
(0.0119)
iit
(-)
-0.5383a
(-0.0257)
-0.5050a
(-0.0161)
-0.4860a
(-0.0132)
-0.4955a
(-0.0179)
-0.5414a
(-0.0778)
-0.4172a
(-0.0121)
it
(-)
-0.3903a
(-0.034)
-0.4525a
(-0.0182)
-0.3814a
(-0.0243)
-0.3830a
(-0.0288)
-0.6597a
(-0.0429)
-0.2993a
(-0.0161)
TCRLit
(+)
0.1985a
(0.0068)
0.1874a
(0.0033)
0.2035a
(0.0036)
0.2040a
(0.0126)
0.2399a
(0.0121)
0.2264a
(0.0056)
NDISC1it
(-)
-0.0488a
(-0.0059)
- -
-0.0526a
(-0.0034)
- -
NDISC2it
(-)
-
-0.0683a
(-0.0026)
- -
-0.0581a
(-0.0057)
-
NDISC3it
(-)
- -
-0.0789a
(-0.0031)
- -
-0.0872a
(-0.0011)
NDISCitDum
(-)
-0.0250a
(-0.0031)
-0.0520a
(-0.0019)
-0.0450a
(-0.0020)
-0.0154a
(-0.0059)
-0.0619a
(-0.0115)
-0.0410a
(-0.0049)
DISC1it
(?)
-0.0104a
(-0.2123)
-0.0056a
(-0.0013)
-0.0075a
(-0.0011)
- - -
DISC2it
(+)
- - -
0.0189a
(0.0029)
0.0088
(0.0108)
0.0236a
(0.0022)
J-stat
(p-value)
98.02
(0.45)
98.50
(0.44)
99.69
(0.40)
98.94
(0.43)
93.56
(0.58)
104.24
(0.29)
Obs. 556 556 556 556 556 556
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity following Whites methodology.
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